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Abstract. This paper will discuss the current state 
of riparian rights in Georgia, particularly in the 
irrigation context. There will be a discussion of the 
history of the riparian doctrine, including its origins 
and application in Georgia. The paper will then discuss 
fully the Pyle v. Gilbert decision, exploring the 
extensions that the Georgia Supreme Court has made in 
Georgia's riparian law. This will lead to a conclusion 
that the dramatic alterations in the riparian doctrine 
may have frustrated its original purposes. 
TRADITIONAL RIPARIANISM 
The riparian doctrine is an old concept. Under 
the Institutes of Justinian, running water, like wildlife, 
could not be possessed, but could be used beneficially 
by all: English courts, when confronted with disputes 
over competing water uses, applied the maxim sic utero 
tuo ut alienum non laedas; a person should use his 
property in a manner that does not injure the property 
of another. 2 As one English court stated, "Every 
proprietor has an equal right to the use of the water 
which flows in the stream; and consequently, no 
proprietor can have the right to use the water to the 
prejudice of any other proprietor." 3 This is commonly 
referred to as the natural flow theory of the riparian 
doctrine. 
Explaining the riparian's right to use the water 
in the stream, and the penalty for withdrawing too 
much water, English legal scholar J. B. Phear wrote: 
The Institutes of Justinian state: 	"Et quidam naturali jure 
communia sunt omnium hmc, aer, aqua profluens, mare, et per hoc 
littora maxis," which translates to: "Things common to mankind by 
the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently, the shores of the sea." J. Inst. 2.1.1 (Thomas Cooper 
trans. 2d ed. 1841). 
2 See J.B. Phear, Rights of Water, at 16 (1859), see also Black's 
Law Dict. 1380 (6 th ed. 1990). 
3 Wright v. Howard, 1 S. & H. 190, quoted in Phear, supra note 13, 
at 20,21. 
Although a riparian cannot permanently divert 
water from the stream, he is not restricted from 
using it within his own bounds for irrigation, or 
from otherwise temporarily diverting it in any 
other way, provided he finally returns it to his 
neighbour by the old channel: he may even 
consume it, otherwise than for domestic 
purposes, and by the mouths of his cattle, as 
long as he does so reasonably, and without 
producing sensible diminution in the stream. It 
cannot be laid down in the abstract what 
constitutes a sensible diminution; this must 
depend upon the circumstances in each case; 
probably a diminution of one-fifth would 
always afford a good ground of action to the 
inferior proprietor; but it must be remembered 
that, whatever be the legitimate usufruct in any 
case, the moment it is exceeded by any 
proprietor, a cause of action accrues to his 
neighbour, whether the latter be actually 
injured by such excessive user or not. 4 
Thus, under English riparian law, the riparian had the 
right to use the water, but when that use unreasonably 
diminished the water flow, the downstream riparian 
had a cause of action, regardless of whether there was 
actual injury. 
In regards to irrigation, Phear states that the 
farmer "may make trenches to conduct the water to 
irrigate his land, if he returns it with no other loss than 
that which irrigation caused." 5 In the 19th century, 
irrigation was accomplished through the use of canals, 
such that the water might be used to irrigate and then 
returned to the stream with no other diminishment than 
that caused by "absorption and evaporation." 6 That 
should be compared to modern irrigation, performed by 
complex and expensive machinery, which, if used 
Phear, supra note 13, at 24-27. 
5 Id. at 26. 
6 1d. 
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properly, by misting only as much water onto the crop 
as can be efficiently absorbed, is one hundred percent 
consumptive, returning little or no water to the stream.' 
Traditional riparianism also limited water use 
to riparian land. Courts accomplished this by using 
variously four restrictive tests. First, riparian land must 
obviously have physical contact with the watercourse. 8 
 This is the physical contact test. Second, some courts 
have applied a watershed test, under which riparian 
rights can only be exercised for the benefit of land 
within the watershed. 9 Even if land satisfied the 
physical contact test, any contiguous property outside 
of the watershed would not be considered riparian land. 
This ensures that any water withdrawn but not 
consumed will benefit the watershed and return to the 
watercourse through the hydrologic cycle. I° 
The third and fourth tests use legal concepts to 
further limit the extent to which land is considered 
riparian. Under the single transaction test, land not 
physically touching the watercourse must have been 
acquired at the same time as the land bordering the 
stream." "The practical effect of this single transaction 
requirement is to limit riparian land to the smallest area 
held by a party under a chain of title including the land 
adjoining the watercourse." I2 The unitary tract test has 
a similar function but is less restrictive than the single 
transaction test. The unitary tract test requires that the 
riparian property be considered under community 
standards as being a single tract of land. I3 
These restrictions dramatically limit the 
exercise of riparian rights. The restrictions benefit the 
watershed environment by helping to ensure that water 
will be used and remain within the watershed. They act 
to maximize the value of land that satisfies the riparian 
requirements by limiting the number of users. This 
gives riparians an incentive to protect their interests 
and the stream itself. On the other hand, these 
restrictions have been criticized as being inefficient and 
arbitrary. I4 Land within the watershed may be deprived 
of the benefit of water use merely because of fictional 
boundaries created by legal title. I5 In situations where 
7  See Kundell, supra note 11, at 13. 
8 See Lynda A. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a 
Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public 
and Private Rights, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95, at 109. 
9 See id. at 111. 
I° See id. at 112. 
II See id. at 117-118. 
12 Id. at 118. 
13 See id. at 121-122. 
14 See generally id. 
15 See id. at 120. 
water is plentiful, otherwise reasonable uses may be 
denied without any obvious benefit to the watershed. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIPARIANISM IN 
GEORGIA 
In 1848, the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Hendrick v. Cook I6 adopted the natural flow theory of 
riparian law rather than appropriation law (commonly 
applied in western states). Hendrick was an action in 
trespass maintained by a plaintiff mill operator against 
a defendant who had constructed a dam across a stream 
upon which both parties were riparian. The effect of 
the dam was to stop the flow of the stream. Though the 
water did not exceed its normal channel, its level above 
the dam raised ten inches, and was stagnant, such that it 
would not turn the plaintiffs mill whee1. 17 The court 
defined the riparian doctrine in the following manner: 
"Each proprietor of the land in the banks of the creek, 
has a natural and equal right to the use of the water 
which flows therein as it was wont to run, without 
diminution or alteration. Neither party has the right to 
use the water in the creek, to the prejudice of the 
other." I8 
Furthermore, the Hendrick court announced 
that a riparian has a right to a reasonable use of the 
water, including for domestic, agricultural, and 
manufacturing purposes, "provided, that in making 
such use, he does not work a material injury to the 
other proprietors." I9 Applying that rule, the court 
found that the defendant's dam, though it did no actual 
damage to the plaintiffs mill, did prevent the plaintiff 
from exercising his right to reasonably use the water. 
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover nominal damages, even if there was no actual 
injury, in order to protect his rights. 20 
Reasonable use under English law referred to 
the quantity of water used rather than the purpose the 
water was used for. Any use that noticeably 
diminished the flow would give rise to a cause of 
action, regardless of any actual injury. For the most 
part, the Hendrick court followed that reasoning. The 
difference lies in the reasonable use language. 
Under Hendrick, certain uses are considered 
reasonable so long as they do not invade other 
riparians' right to use. These are domestic, 
16 4 Ga. 241 (1848). 
17 Id. at 257, 258. 
18 1d. at 256. 
19 m 
20 See id. 
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manufacturing, and irrigation uses. Domestic uses are 
consumptive, but only on a de minimis level; a 
household can only take out so much water for personal 
use. Similarly, the primary manufacturing use in the 
nineteenth century was for turning mill wheels, which 
was generally not consumptive at al1. 21 Finally, as 
noted previously, traditional canal irrigation was only 
consumptive to the extent that water was absorbed or 
evaporated. The Georgia view is more utilitarian than 
the English view, allowing for greater exploitation of 
the water resource. At the same time, the Hendrick 
rule still does not allow for overly consumptive uses. 
The Georgia Supreme Court considered the 
parameters of reasonable use in Price v. High Shoals  
Manufacturing Company, 132 Ga. 246, 64 S.E. 87 
(1909), where the issue was whether the defendant 
upstream company's machinery was too large for the 
stream. The defendant had constructed a dam across 
the stream in order to form a reservoir to provide water 
resources for a substantial increase in its manufacturing 
machinery.22 The dam was closed at night, with the 
result that the plaintiff downstream riparian was 
deprived of the flow of the stream until noon each day, 
and until the stream reached full flow, the plaintiff 
could not operate his mill. 23 The court held that 
reasonable use was a jury question, and listed some of 
the factors that the jury could use to determine if the 
use was reasonable: 
What is a reasonable use is a question for the 
jury in view of all the facts in the case, taking 
into consideration the nature and use of the 
machinery, the quantity of water used in its 
operation, the use to which the stream can be 
applied, the velocity of its current, the 
character and size of the watercourse, and the 
varying circumstances of each case. 24 
This indicates that whether a use is reasonable is a fact 
question requiring consideration of both the reasons for 
the use and the degree of flow alteration the use 
creates. 
The Georgia Supreme Court considered the 
riparian land restriction in two principal cases. In City  
of Elberton v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 749, 49 S.E. 779 (1905), 
21 See A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights To 
Watersheds, 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 69, at 89 
(2000). 
22 See Price at 132 Ga. 247, 64 S.E. 88. 
23 See Price at 132 Ga. 248, 64 S.E. 88. 
24 Price at 132 Ga. 248, 64 S.E. 89. 
the city of Elberton purchased land adjacent to a non-
navigable stream to withdraw water for municipal use. 
The withdrawal reduced the level of flow such that a 
downstream riparian, who operated a mill, could not 
operate her business. She sued to either enjoin the 
city's withdrawal or to win compensation for the taking 
of her riparian right. The court first held that riparian 
law did not give the municipality the right to withdraw 
the water for non-riparian uses. Furthermore, the court 
held that if the municipality's actions invaded a 
riparian's right to reasonably use the flow of a stream, 
there was a taking: 
The right of the owner of land through which a 
non-navigable stream flows to have its waters 
come to his land in the natural and usual flow 
is inseparably annexed to the soil and is parcel 
of the land itself, and comes within the 
protection of the constitutional provision which 
forbids the taking of private property for public 
purposes, without just and adequate 
compensation being first paid. 25 
The Georgia Supreme Court relied on City of 
Elberton in Hendrix v. Roberts Marble Company, 175 
Ga. 389, 165 S.E. 223 (1932). In Hendrix, an upstream 
riparian had sold his water rights to a non-riparian 
factory, the plaintiff. The defendant, a downstream 
riparian marble factory, in a cross-motion to the 
plaintiff's complaints, sought to enjoin the plaintiff 
from diverting water from the stream. In affirming the 
grant of an injunction, the court held that non-riparians 
could not acquire riparian rights. 
The court is of the opinion that under the law 
riparian rights are appurtenant only to lands 
which actually touch on the watercourse, or 
through which it flows, and that a riparian 
owner or proprietor can not himself lawfully 
use or convey to another the right to use water 
flowing along or through his property, upon 
non-riparian lands or lands physically 
separated from the lands bordering upon the 
stream. 26 
In the cases above, the Georgia Supreme Court 
adopted riparianism, but in a form distinguishable from 
natural flow riparianism. Georgia riparians are allowed 
25 Elberton, syllabus. 
26 Hendrix at 175 Ga. 394, 165 S.E. 226. 
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to diminish the flow of the stream for reasonable 
purposes. The English reasonable use applied to the 
amount of diminishment. Under Georgia riparianism, 
whether or not a use is reasonable is determined by 
balancing the amount of water used and the purpose. 
City of Elberton and Hendrix required the use to be by 
a riparian for the benefit of riparian land, physically 
contacting the stream. A riparian has an immediate 
cause of action if there is a diversion affecting the 
natural flow of the stream. However, if that diversion 
is by a riparian, and is for a reasonable use, then the 
diversion will not be enjoined unless the plaintiff is 
materially injured, either through actual damage, or 
through the obstruction of the plaintiffs riparian rights. 
RECENT COURT DECISIONS AND GEORGIA 
RIPARIANISM 
In 1980, the Georgia Supreme Court heard Pyle  
v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980). This 
case may be an example of the maxim hard cases make 
bad law. In Pyle, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the 
withdrawal of water from a small tributary of the 
Chattahoochee River for irrigation of several farms in 
Early County. The plaintiff wished to rebuild and open 
a gristmill that had burned down, but the upstream 
withdrawal diminished the stream flow to a level that 
made the mill inoperable. 
In earlier cases, on similar facts, the court had 
ruled that the plaintiff had a right to reasonably use the 
stream flow, and the defendant could not reduce the 
flow to a degree that prevented the plaintiff from 
exercising that right. 27 Those cases, however, are more 
than one hundred years old, and gristmills are now 
anachronisms. In contrast, the farms that were 
withdrawing for irrigation were commercial operations 
that used irrigation to produce agricultural products. 
The case arose in the area of Georgia where agriculture 
is the most significant land use, and where surface 
water is the principal water source for large 
withdrawals. The Georgia Supreme Court would go on 
to rule for the defendants, and in doing so, substantially 
change Georgia's application of the riparian doctrine. 
To understand the Supreme Court's decision, it 
is necessary to discuss the posture of the case on 
appeal. The trial court had made several rulings, which 
the Supreme Court would overturn. First, the trial 
court made a preliminary ruling that the diversion for 
27 See White v. The East Lake Land Company, 96 Ga. 415, 23 S.E. 
393 (1895). 
irrigation was an invasion of the plaintiffs riparian 
rights, and unreasonable as a matter of law. 28 In 
making that ruling, the trial court relied on findings of 
fact as to the defendants' combined withdrawal and the 
diminishment in the flow of the stream. 29 The trial 
court also found that the diversions were improper 
because the water was used to irrigate non-riparian 
farms. One of the farmers, in fact, was not a riparian, 
but had acquired permission to irrigate from an 
upstream riparian. 3° 
The Georgia Supreme Court first explained 
that irrigation was a traditional use under the 
agriculture provision of the reasonable use exception. 31 
 The court cited the law of Hendricks as initial 
support. 32 The court also relied on Georgia legislation, 
which is based closely on the case law discussed 
above. 33 The court cited Georgia's Water Quality 
Control Act (Ga. L. 1977, p. 368), which exempted 
farm uses_ from water withdrawal permitting 
requirements. 34 The court also emphasized some 
utilitarian language from Price: 
If the general rule that each riparian owner 
could not in any way interrupt or diminish the 
flow of the stream were strictly followed, the 
water would be of but little practical use to any 
proprietor, and the enforcement of such rule 
would deny, rather than grant, the use thereof. 35 
The court did not discuss the changed nature of 
agricultural irrigation from the time at which the 
reasonable use exception was developed. The court 
found that the reasonable use exception included 
28 See Pyle at 245 Ga. 404, 265 S.E.2d 585. 
29 Id. at 245 Ga. 408-409, 265 S.E.2d 588. 
3° Id. at 245 Ga. 404, 265 S.E.2d 586. 
31 Id. at 245 Ga. 407, 265 S.E.2d 587. 
32 Id. at 245 Ga. 404-405.265 S.E.2d 586. 
33 Id. at 245 Ga. 405-406, 265 S.E.2d 586-587. 
34 Id. at 245 Ga. 408, 265 S.E.2d 588. It should be noted that 
currently O.C.G.A. § 12-5-31 (2000) does not exempt all farm 
uses, but rather withdrawals to create impoundments for farm uses. 
Withdrawals over 100,000 gallons per day must be permitted 
pursuant to O.C.G.A. §12-5-31. Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-
31(a)(3) provides specifically for the permitting of irrigation 
withdrawals in order to "ensure the applicant's right to a reasonable 
use of such surface waters" in the future. This provision reflects the 
concern of farmers that, though the exemption from permitting 
requirements may have reduced red tape, it may not have protected 
their future rights to irrigate against other permitted uses. See 
Adron Harden, Agricultural Water Use: Concerns, Georgia Water 
Resources—Issues and Options, 54 (James E. Kundell ed. 1980). 
38 Price at 132 Ga. 248-249, 64 S.E. 88, quoted in Pyle at 245 Ga. 
406, 265 S.E.2d 587. 
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agriculture, and that the courts and the legislature 
contemplated irrigation as an agricultural use. 
Therefore, the court held that the issue for the trial 
court was whether the plaintiff suffered material injury 
from the irrigation, and that this was to be determined 
by the jury, rather than the trial judge. 36 
The court then considered the issue of non-
riparian use, finding that riparian rights should not be 
restricted only to riparians. Unfortunately, the court 
gave this issue little discussion, considering the 
considerable degree of change it would make in 
Georgia's riparian law. The court cited a 1955 study 
that stated: "Another disadvantage of this [riparian] 
doctrine is that it permits the use of stream water only 
in connection with riparian land." 37 The purpose of that 
study was to formulate a more economically efficient 
means of controlling the use of the state's water 
resources. It does not consider the importance of 
maintaining stream flow and the role of the riparian 
doctrine in protecting the Georgia's environment. 
The court also considered the recommendation 
of the American Law Institute (ALI), as expressed in 
the 2d Restatement of Torts §855, which advocates the 
extension of riparian rights to non-riparian users. The 
ALI's position is based on two arguments: first, that 
riparian rights are property rights, and should be treated 
like other property rights; and second, that such a 
change allows for more utilitarian use of water 
resources. 38 
Having decided to overhaul the riparian 
doctrine, the Georgia Supreme Court distinguished 
Elberton to apply only to the condemnation of riparian 
rights.39 The court ignored the fact that in Elberton, if 
that court had not ruled that the municipality could not 
exercise riparian rights on non-riparian land, then there 
would have been no issue of condemnation or taking. 
The Pyle court flatly overruled Hendrix. 49 
In 1982, the Georgia Supreme Court revisited 
the issue of riparian irrigation in Stewart v. Bridges, 
249 Ga. 626, 292 S.E.2d 702 (1982). In Stewart, all of 
the parties had bought land bordering a man-made lake 
in a planned subdivision. The defendant bought 
property adjacent to the lake that was contiguous with a 
36 Pyle at 245 Ga. 409, 265 S.E.2d 588. 
37 The Institute of Law and Government of the Schhol of Law, The 
University of Georgia, A Study of the Riparian and Prior 
Appropriation Doctrines of Water Law, 104 (1955), quoted in Pyle 
at 245 Ga. 410, 265 S.E.2d 589. 
38 See. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 855 & §856 cmt. b. 
39 See Pyle at 245 Ga. 410, 265 S.E.2d 589. 
49 See id.  
farm he already owned. He used water from the lake to 
irrigate the adjoining farm. The plaintiffs, other 
landowners around the lake, sued to enjoin the 
defendant from using the lake for irrigation. The court 
determined that parties owning lake front land had 
rights to the water in the lake in its entirety and were 
subject to the riparian servitude without respect to 
upstream or downstream flow:" Having found that 
riparian law applied, the court cited Pyle v. Gilbert for 
support that it was proper for the defendant to exercise 
his riparian rights for the benefit of non-riparian land. 42 
 The court did not discuss the reasoning or validity of 
that rule. 
In Pyle, the interpretation of reasonable use 
was extended to include irrigation as a traditional -
reasonable use. The possible flaw in this is that the 
traditional uses were either non-consumptive or 
consumptive only on a de minimis level. Modern 
irrigation, conversely, can be highly consumptive. 
Furthermore, riparian rights are no longer restricted to 
riparians or riparian land. While the restriction to 
riparian land has been criticized, it serves the 
environment by giving incentives to riparians to guard 
the stream flow to protect their own property values, 
and by helping to ensure that water that is withdrawn 
benefits the watershed. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasoning of Pyle v. Gilbert focuses on 
economically efficient use of water resources. It does 
not consider protection of the watershed environment. 
By extending the reasonable use exception to include 
irrigation, the court may have undermined riparians' 
ability to protect their riparian rights and the 
watercourse itself. In striking the restriction that 
riparian rights not be exercised for non-riparian uses, 
the Court ignored the restriction's purpose of 
maintaining the integrity of the watercourse and 
watershed. It would be advisable to reconsider the 
extension and alteration of the riparian doctrine in light 
of the effects on Georgia's environment and economy. 
41 See Stewart at 249 Ga. 627, 292 S.E.2d 704. 
42 See id. 
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